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During the past six decades, the Toyota Motor Company established a ‘lean’
production and management system (the Toyota Way), which has become an iconic
template for a high performing and learning organization. The massive recall crisis of
2009/2010 distorted Toyota’s image of a role model for a lean organization heavily.
This case study analyzes retrospectively how the carmaker deviated from their
original organizational configuration that was distinctive for its lean management
system. We illustrate how managerial decisions geared towards extensive growth
and globalization distorted complementarities among central elements of the Toyota
Way, and ultimately caused organizational misfit. Whereas most of the literature on
complementarities and organizational fit has emphasized processes of adaptation
and evolution toward internal fit or misfit that are triggered by exogenous
environmental changes, our case study of Toyota shows that external misfit can also
be the unintended consequence of deliberate changes in the firm’s system of
interdependent choices.
Keywords: Toyota, Lean production, Organizational complementarities, External and
internal misfitBackground
In 2009 Toyota found itself in the deepest and most dramatic crisis of its history that
culminated in a recall of over 9 million cars worldwide, including 5,3 million cars in its
most important North American market, due to burgeoning quality problems that in-
volved most if its product line-up. Before the crisis, Toyota has been the unchallended
leader of international automobile quality rankings for decades. The outstanding repu-
tation for quality was grounded in the Japanese carmaker’s renowned production and
management system, also known as the Toyota Way and became world famous as lean
production. This system was extensively studied, documented through various academic
and management publications and copied within and beyond the automobile industry.
The dramatic recall wave of 2009–2010, however, shed a new light on Toyota’s evolution:
What went wrong? What were the root causes of those recalls? Could they be
anticipated?
This study sets out to investigate the root causes of the Toyota crisis starting from
the conceptualization of the Toyota Way as a system of interconnected organizational2016 Camuffo and Wilhelm. Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
nternational License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in
ny medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons
icense, and indicate if changes were made.
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complementarities framework (Siggelkow 2001; Siggelkow 2002; Siggelkow 2011), that
sees the firm as a system of interconnected choices, we build on two fundamental
assumptions: organizational performance derives from a) tight organizational comple-
mentarities between a firm’s activity choices that reinforce mutually in a positive way
(internal fit), and b) the appropriateness of a firm’s system of activities with the envir-
onmental conditions that it is facing (external fit). We use this lens to interpret the in-
cremental deviation of Toyota from the lean system it pioneered and perfected over its
company’s history. We show how a number of managerial decisions at Toyota loosened
system-internal complementarities that led to the detrimental deviation from the ori-
ginal lean system. Our analysis will focus on the most central principles of lean produc-
tion, i.e., built in quality, and trace internal complementarities among organizational
design choices made in manufacturing, supplier management, and human resources.
Besides depicting the development of the Japanese carmaker prior to the crisis, we
illustrate that organizational mis-fit is not solely determined by exogenous environmen-
tal changes with senior management failing to respond to such changes because of iner-
tia or overconfidence, but the unintended consequence of deliberate changes in the
firm’s configuration of interdependent choices.
Complementarities and fit in the Toyota way
Taiichi Ohno (1988) – who is often referred to as the grandfather of the Toyota Way –was
the first to stress the system character of lean production. Ohno emphasizes that what
makes Toyota stand out is not any of the individual elements, but having all the elements
together as a system and practice them every day in a very consistent manner, not in spurts.
In fact, most of the “lean” literature and many of the studies of the Toyota production and
management system have adopted (explicitly or implicitly) a configurational approach.
Womack et al. (1990) were the first to conceive lean production as a configuration and have
summarized it as a universally applicable system. Since then, the original conceptualization
has evolved as a result of theory refinements and empirical studies. Lean production is a
system that ought to be distinguished from the lean characterizing elements and manifesta-
tions that Sugimori et al. (1977) originally described. Some of the literature emphasizes the
philosophy of lean and its underlying principles (Womack and Jones 1996; Spear and
Bowen 1999); some other underline the practical and observable aspects of the related prac-
tices, tools, processes (Shah and Ward 2003). Empirical evidence for a configuration ap-
proach to lean production was first given by MacDuffie (1995) who demonstrated that the
superior performance of lean production systems can be linked back both to the inter-
relatedness of several HR practices in an “internally consistent HR bundle” as well as the in-
tegration of that bundle with lean manufacturing policies. Shah and Ward (2007) study
offers a definition of lean production as an integrated socio-technical system whose main
objective is to eliminate waste by concurrently reducing or minimizing supplier, customer
and internal variability. More recently, De Menezes et al. (2010) study demonstrates how
the integrated application of lean practices supports the achievement of multiple goals and
results in superior performance. These studies largely converge on the organizational attri-
butes that distinguish the “lean configuration” which usually includes just-in-time produc-
tion, supermarkets and kanban, quality systems, work teams, workers’ multiskilling, people
internal development and careers, collaborative supplier management, set-based product
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figuration in a formative sense (Fiss 2009), referring to the “actual” configuration or activity
system of Toyota, observing the empirical manifestations of the construct and highlighting
the deviations of it from the idealtype. More specifically, our case study focuses on the
dynamics of such deviation.
We complement the idea of lean production as an organizational configuration drawing
upon the stream of strategy research that studies the relationship between sustainable com-
petitive advantages and the existence of complementarities within activity systems (Porter and
Siggelkow 2008). This stream of research uses two related notions: “complementarities” and
“performance landscape”. Milgrom and Roberts (1990) define complementarities as the rela-
tionship between two or more activities implying that “doing more of any one of them in-
creases the returns to doing more of the others”. Overall, complementarity theory suggests
that high performing firms are likely to combine a consistent set of activities and that the
returns to such full configuration of activities are greater than the sum of the individual
returns (Whittington et al. 1999). The notion of performance landscape, originally developed
in evolutionary biology, was refined and formalized by Kauffman (1993). In our sim-
plified analysis, the performance landscape is a multidimensional space in which one
or more organizational outcomes (for example, business growth, market share, stock
market performance and/or profitability), are causally mapped onto a set of
organizational characteristics (Fiss 2007). If the set attributes are N, the performance
landscape maps each set of N attributes onto performance. The appropriateness of a
set of choices given environmental conditions (i.e. external fit) is represented by the
height of a particular point on the landscape. If choices are complementary (i.e. in-
ternal fit), or consistent, their combination corresponds to a performance peak in the
landscape. The stronger these complementarities are, the steeper is the associated
peak. High internal fit results in sustained competitive advantages, as competitors will
find it hard to imitate entire systems rather than individual activities (Rivkin 2000).
Alternatively, a set of choices is defined to be consistent if changing any single choice,
ceteris paribus, implies a performance decline.
We thus assume that the “lean production system” is an organizational configuration
causally linked to high performance. The recall crisis of 2009/2010 revealed an external
misfit of Toyota’s lean configuration and we use the crisis as a starting point to explore
the interplay and dynamics of external and internal misfit, i.e. the process of how orga-
nizations may deliberately or unintentionally deviate from a given configuration. In the
next section, we will trace Toyota’s organizational design choices in the 2000’s based on
the wealth of published material in the academic and business press on Toyota (please
see Appendix) before we analyze the managerial changes that were being made that led
to the distortion of internal, and ultimately, also external fit.Case presentation
Organizational fit: Toyota’s ‘lean’ configuration in the early 2000’s
At the end of the 1990’s, Toyota’s organizational system had been studied and analyzed
to the point of becoming the living example for lean production. This system has
allowed Toyota to efficiently engineer and build high quality cars and has granted
Toyota the status of being the best car manufacturer in the world.
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mentarities within lean production, the focus of our analysis will be on one of the most
central principles in lean production – built-in-quality –and trace internal complemen-
tarities with other organizational design choices made in manufacturing, supplier
management and human resources.
Built in quality and ‘Andon’
A central aim of lean production is to achieve built in quality and avoid costly repairs
after end assembly. One central operational practice in the Toyota Way to ensure this
aim was pulling the Andon cord. Andon is a fixed-position line stop system (Liker
2004) that connects a cord located above the assembly line with Andons (visual boards,
or panels or simple lights). When a line worker noticed an abnormality (e.g. quality de-
fect) in a workstation he or she pulled the cord, the Andon would light up in yellow,
but the line will continue moving. Until the time the vehicle moved into the next
workstation, the team leader had to respond before the andon turns red and the line
segment automatically stops. This was likely to be a matter of 15–30 s on an assembly
line building cars at a 60” cycle time. During this time, the team leader might have im-
mediately fixed the problem or noted how it can be fixed while the car was moving into
other workstations. In this case, the team leader would pull the cord again to cancel
the line stoppage. Only if the problem could not be fixed immediately, would the team
leader decide to stop the line. It is important to note that Andon was more than a mere
technical device but a micro-element that supported the central principle of the Toyota
Way, i.e., built in quality (Spear and Bowen 1999). This required, however, that Andon
was complemented through other organizational design choices.
Choices in manufacturing
On a more operational level Andon was supported by decentralization, i.e., the alloca-
tion of decision rights to workers and team leaders who were entitled to pull the
Andon cord (and, possibly, stop the line). This had positive effects on performance be-
cause it potentially reduced quality problems. The second design choice was the stan-
dardized sequence of behaviors, coupled with artifacts (the Andon cord) that the actors
involved performed. This set of routines helped prevent quality problems by avoiding
the passing of defects downstream in the assembly process, without stopping produc-
tion. Due to the standardization of behavioral routines actual line stoppages were re-
duced to a necessary minimum. This did not only affect productivity positively but also
had second order effects on quality (stoppages increases frequency of errors due to
workers’ cognitive distraction). The third design choice was the availability of team
leaders by having a small ratio of team leaders to workers (approximately 1:5). This im-
proved the line productivity per se, for example, by covering absences or assisting
workers in various ways. In fact, this operational availability was an important indicator
of a shop floor’s capability of keeping its production line flowing.
Choices in HRM
Additional complementarities existed between Andon and organizational design
choices in HRM, which has often been considered the most central part of the Toyota
system (Liker and Meier 2007; Liker 2004; Liker and Hoseus 2008). Andon required
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to Andon calls. Furthermore, workers needed to develop a conceptual grasp of the pro-
duction process to identify problems as they appeared on the line, and the analytical skills
to identify the root causes of the problems. Job-rotation helped to create a holistic under-
standing of the overall production process (Adler et al. 1999). The conceptual grasp of the
overall production process was also a prerequisite for worker’s error detection capabilities,
and complementarities existed between job rotation and decentralized decision rights.
Moreover, job rotation was complementary with off-the-job problem-solving activities
that further helped to develop analytical skills. Distinctive of the Toyota Way was that
workers learned to solve problems when they were actually solving problems on-the-job
(Spear and Bowen 1999; Spear 2004). For example, when a worker pulled the Andon cord,
the supervisor would not only repair the defect, but provided guidance to the worker on
how to detect the root cause of the problem. This again created complementarities with
the aforementioned operational availability of the team leader. Further, complementarities
with Andon and the overarching principle of built in quality are created through other de-
sign choice in HRM, i.e., life-time employment and internal career paths that were linked
to continous skill formation for team leaders and workers. Toyota recruited workers (typ-
ically highschool graduates) on the basis of fit with the Toyota culture rather than formal
qualifications. Internal career paths ensured loyalty towards the company and created sus-
tainable incentives for life-long learning (Liker and Meier 2007).
Quality problems, as detected with the practice of Andon, however, can also derive
from supplier components. Thus, there is a close relation with the issue of supplier
management.
Choices in supplier management
From the beginning of Toyota’s company history, suppliers took over a large part of Toyota’s
value creation and the quality of the end product was, thus, highly dependent also on their
capabilities (Fruin and Nishiguchi 1993). Toyota made relation-specific investments by of-
fering various forms of assistance to its suppliers to help them achieve quality and efficiency
targets. Lean production experts from Toyota’s Operations Management Consulting Div-
ision (OMCD) frequently visited suppliers’ plants to help implement lean principles (Dyer
and Nobeoka 2000). Even in the US, where Toyota purchased a smaller amount of parts
compared to US OEMs, Toyota sent its senior engineers to help an average of 13 days per
visit, compared to only six by US OEMs (Dyer and Hatch 2006). Furthermore, Toyota also
coordinated and facilitated suppliers’ study groups (Jishuken). These were groups of sup-
pliers that engaged on a yearly basis in the study and improvement of specific production
related themes of mutual interest. The two modes of supplier development, supplier study
groups and individual supplier assistance from the OMCD, can be considered complemen-
tary, as “the former gives suppliers the space to experiment and explore on their own while
the latter provides a top-down quick solution by Toyota experts, which on its own may dis-
courage learning” (Sako 2004: p. 291). The organizational design choice to separate supplier
development activities of the purchasing planning division from those of the operations
management consulting division (OMCD) created further complementarities as it main-
tained incentives for suppliers to enhance their evolutionary capabilities for the long-term,
as they can be assured that their customer will not use the deep process insights they gain
for commercial advantages (Dyer and Nobeoka 2000). At the same time, supplier
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ing tacit skills to suppliers.
Internal and external fit
Figure 1 illustrates these complementarities for the elements outlined above, resulting
in high internal fit. Andon ensured built in quality and was complementary with other
organizational design choices such as the decentralization of decision rights, worker’s
training and career systems, and supplier development activities. A major trade-off that
evolved around theses choices was, however, that life-long training of workers and the es-
tablishment of supplier relations was time consuming. For example, it took about 9–10
years to develop a worker to a team leader, and another 4–5 years to reach the next higher
supervisory position of a group leader. Moreover, it took about five years for a supplier to
be appointed for a vehicle project and another five years until the supplier had proven
himself to gain a more substantial order volume (Görtz 2006).
These obvious time disadvantages were, however, alleviated through Toyota’s growth
and sales strategy up to the year 2000, which made the external fit of Toyota’s lean con-
figuration apparent: In the initial phase of its global expansion, marked by Toyota’s first
plant openings in the US in the 1980s, Toyota relied heavily on its domestic plants to
satisfy the continous growth in global consumer demand with an export rate of over
60 %. This allowed Toyota to make full use of its sophisticated but highly contextual
HRM system and secure investments in internal career and training systems.
Initially, foreign sales took place mostly in the US and Toyota invested in local facil-
ities to replicate its lean configuration system. The successful transfer of the Toyota
system of supplier management and HRM in the 1990s in the US has been wellFig. 1 Complementarities and fit between organizational choices in the Toyota Way (bold lines indicate
strong complementarities between organizational choices)
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the same time, Toyota still manufactured around half of its global demand domestically
and made use of “bridge production”, i.e. exports to fill in excess U.S. demands
(Chappell 2012). Thus, Toyota’s sales activities were concentrated on two main regions
and demand was relatively stable. Stable production levels with little fluctuations were an
important prerequisite for the smooth functioning of the Toyota system with just-in-time
delivery, standardized work procedures and continous improvement activities. Another
factor that accounted for high external fit was relatively weak foreign competition in terms
of quality, as revealed by major benchmarking studies in the automobile industry. Strong
domestic competition, on the other hand, and with Nissan in particular, was often said to
be an additional driving force behind the Toyota Way (Kawahara 1998).The distortion of complementarities and organizational misfit between 2000 and 2010
At the end of 2009, when almost every other global carmaker was enjoying profit gains,
Toyota found itself in the most dramatic crisis of its history due to burgeoning quality prob-
lems and product recalls. Searching for the causes of declining product quality, Akio
Toyoda, the grandson of Toyota’s founder and Toyota’s current president, publicly declared
that since 2003 Toyota’s rapid expansion led to a state where sales grew faster than the
company could manage (Shirouzu 2010). The strategic change towards faster growth was
initiated in 1995 with the appointment of Hiroshi Okuda as the company’s new president
who oversaw the shift from conservative corporate style to aggressive management and was
the driving force behind Toyota’s global ascendance (Sato 2006). He was the designer of a
global growth strategy, the “2005 vision”, characterized by the ambition to rapidly increase
Toyota’s global market share from 7.3 % in 1995 to 15 % in 2010 (Cole 2011).
As a result, internationalization speed increased dramatically: In a 7-year period
between 2000 and 2007 Toyota opened 18 new plants all around the world, pro-
foundly changing the company in terms of size and geographical dispersion. Due
to this extensive internationalization, Toyota became the largest car manufacturer
in the world in 2008 with over 8.3 million sold vehicles. In retrospect, Toyota’s
rapid growth might have come at the expense of harming some of the basic princi-
ples of Toyota’s management model that once were the prerequisite of the com-
pany’s impressive performance.
Although Toyota initially tried to build on its principles of lifelong employment, internal
career paths and continuous training also for its overseas operations, it was facing high
turnover among its experienced members in its U.S. operations. An amalgation of nearly a
dozen subsidiaries, including manufacturing organizations for its plants that were located at
geographical distance to each other, created a high travel burden for managers: in 2005 To-
yota lost ten percent and in 2006 five percent of its experienced staff (Chappell 2007). The
geographic dispersion of its operations also made it hard for Toyota to ensure high quality
of trainings and Steve St. Angelo, the former North America Manufacturing Chief, noted in
2010 that there are so many Toyota Way rules that American workers “just don’t under-
stand”. The Toyota Way is highly tacit and, thus, relies heavily on on-the-job training. Even
worse, a lot of the existing written guidelines date back from the decade when TMC was
founded (Greimel 2010). Equally problematic was the fact that some of Toyota’s global fac-
tories did not adhere to the company’s basic creeds, like allowing workers to stop factory
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ecutive diagnosed (Fackler 2007).
Toyota’s expansion strategy also affected the company’s global employee headcount
that shot up from 183,000 to 321,000 within a decade (Greimel 2010). This massive in-
crease did, however, create a number of problems and it became increasingly difficult
for Toyota to satisfy the need for internally developed managers, technicians, supervi-
sors and operators fully consistent with Toyota’s philosophy and corporate culture. For
its San Antonio plant, for example, Toyota admitted to have a tougher time than ex-
pected to find skilled manufacturing staff as it was facing the challenge of bringing in
not just 2000 employees for its own production, but another 1000 employees to the
various supplier lines next door (Chappell 2005). Toyota tried to react to this challenge
by massively hiring temporary workers in production. The extensive use of temporary
workers turned out to be highly problematic as they were not integrated in Toyota’s in-
ternal career and training system and, thus, tend to be less experienced and qualified
than regular workers. The lower degree of qualification harmed the execution of decen-
tralized decision rights as temporary workers were not sufficiently trained to detect ir-
regularities in the work process and pull the Andon Cord.
The severe consequences of the high ratio of temporary workers was illustrated in
the case of Toyota Motor in the United Kingdom (TMUK) where 50 % of the experi-
enced workforce left in the period between 1997 and 2000 as a result of excessive over-
time (Pardi 2005; 2007). Filling in these vacancies with temporary workers led to a
rising pressure on the remaining workforce to fulfill the ambitious productivity targets.
Consequently, the level of stress in production rose and absenteeism rates climbed to a
record-high of 3,11 % in 2000, exceeding the threshold of 2 % that is considered the
structural limit for stable lean operations by Toyota (Pardi 2007). In order to avoid fur-
ther overtime through any delay in the daily production targets, team members hesi-
tated more and more to pull the andon cord to keep the line running. This had
detrimental effects for product quality – for the Avensis, the number of defaults per ve-
hicle doubled between 1999 and 2000 from 0.5 to 1 and for the Corolla, it rose four-
fold from 0.4 to 1.6 (ibid.). Most of these defects were related to elements that were
not supposed to be checked by quality teams but normally belong to the direct respon-
sibility of team members. It became clear that the extensive use of temporary workers
distorted complementarities between the organizational design choices of Andon,
decentralized decision rights (due to their lower qualification and motivation to detect
irregularities), and standardized work procedures (due to disruptions in the work
process caused by temporary workers).
Suppliers were facing similar challenges, as most of them had to import foreign
workers on temporary work visas due to the labor shortage in the Aichi prefecture.
Based on his interactions during a plant tour at the Kamigo engine plant Smalley (n.d.)
cited a Toyota senior manager who admitted that the labour structure has changed en-
tirely in Japan and instead of veteran employees with 15–20 years of experience, there
were around 40 % temporary employees on six-months contracts. The cited manager
considered this a real challenge in terms of turn over in the work force, which has “put
a real strain on Toyota and even more on the supply base” (ibid).
The distorted complementarities with the Andon system and the overarching
principle of built in quality was further exacerbated by the elimination of the team
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several reasons. Partly, it was to economize on organizational structure and cost, and
partly, because it became increasingly complex and costly to develop team leaders at a
pace compatible with new plants’ set-ups. Although the team leader position was re-
introduced in 2008, there was a general tendency in overseas plants to shorten career
paths for supervisory positions. Whereas it takes about 10 years in Japan to become
appointed as team leader, the case of Toyoto in France (TMMF) showed that due to
the high employee fluctuation, team members were often promoted to team leaders
during their first three years (Pardi 2007). Once team leaders became unavailable or
were at least less experienced to perform their task, this had a compounded effect on
quality performance because the other elements (e.g., the decentralization of decision
rights, the routine application of standardized work procedures etc.) lost their beneficial
effects. Moreover, workers had fewer reasons to pull the cord (as they cannot be sure
that the teamleader will come for help), or, if they did, it was more likely that the line
will either stop or that the unsolved problem will pass downstream the assembly
process. The need to speed up temporary workers’ training process further added to
the detrimental effects on quality and efficiency. This domino effect is a symptom of
distorted complementarities (see also Fig. 2).
Toyota’s rapid internationalization also affected complementarities among organizational
choices in supplier management. Possibly triggered by the aggressive cost cutting efforts of
Carlos Ghosn at Nissan, Katsuaki Watanabe, former head of purchasing and known to be a
“ruthless cost cutter” (Treece 2004) announced Toyota’s efficiency program CCC21
(Construction of Cost Competitiveness for the 21st Century) in 2000 that targeted an unpre-
cedented cost reduction of 30 % of Toyota’s parts prices over a five-year period. The programFig. 2 Distorted complementarities and internal misfit (dotted lines indicate distorted complementarities
between organizational choices)
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tion that used internal parts costs of the previous model as a reference. By con-
trast, CCC21 was more strongly geared towards market competition by identifying
about 180 key parts that were benchmarked with parts prices for the world's most
competitive suppliers of those parts – which for the first time also included sup-
pliers in India and China (Chappell 2008). If the keiretsu suppliers did not learn
how to meet the benchmark they risked losing business. The program was consid-
ered a huge success and led to savings of $10 billion in a five-year period. CCC21,
thus, clearly marked a turn from Toyota’s traditional principle of network-internal
competition (Wilhelm 2011) towards more traditional market competition.
The item-based approach of CCC21 was further extended from 2005 to 2009 by a
system-based approach under the “Value Innovation”-program. The program aimed at an
additional cost reduction of 30%, mainly by cutting the number of automobile components
by 50% and integrating them into more encompassing modules (Toyota Motor Corporation
2006). However, this increasingly put Toyota’s network suppliers under pressure as they did
not – unlike their independent Western competitors – have the integrative capabilities to
develop whole modules and systems (Okamura 2005). Traditionally, Toyota has been taking
the lead in its network to coordinate and integrate parts within an architectural system. For
the first time, Toyota group suppliers were facing serious competition with foreign global
suppliers (Okamura 2005). More work being contracted to new overseas suppliers meant
“working with a lot of unfamiliar suppliers who didn’t have a deep understanding of Toyota
culture” (Womack cited in Greimel 2010). Sourcing from new suppliers who are less experi-
enced with Toyota’s processes became particularly problematic in combination with the in-
ternal shortage of senior engineers who could properly supervise these new suppliers
according to Toyota standards (Andrews et al. 2011). More specifically, Toyota was not able
to grant sufficient manufacturing assistance as there were internal capacity problems of
OMCD consultants whose expertise was heavily needed in Toyota’s own overses plant. As a
result, suppliers felt overwhelmed with the responsibility of securing quality and reducing
cost without receiving much assistance from their customer (ibid.).Conclusion
In our retrospective analysis of Toyota’s development from 2000 to 2010 we mapped out
how the once strong complementarities between Toyota’s organizational choices that were
distinctive for the original lean configuration became distorted over time. We emphasized
that this distortion of complementarities was not primarily caused by exogenous environ-
mental changes such as an unfavorable market situation that subsequently led to external
misfit, but corporate strategic choices made by Toyota’s top management. Lured by market
opportunities and the possibility to crown the dream to become the world’s largest auto pro-
ducer, Toyota’s decision makers experimented with strategic changes regarding organizational
growth and globalization. This resulted in a sequence of changes of organizational choices
such as training and HR development systems, management selection and promotion cri-
teria, elimination of team leader position in production, and ruthless supplier cost-cutting
programs. Changing these organizational choices mis-matched the other attributes of Toyo-
ta’s existing lean configuration, and specifically the operational choice of Andon, leading to
the worsening of built in quality and manufacturing performance.
Camuffo and Wilhelm Journal of Organization Design  (2016) 5:4 Page 11 of 13Our case illustrates why firms evolve through punctuated equilibrium with phases of
upheaval, misfit and crisis (Siggelkow and Rivkin 2009). We provide more fine-grained in-
sights into this process by distinguishing between managers’ search for a set of consistent
organizational choices that determine firm performance. We argue that a mismatch be-
tween organizational choices – as observed in the case of Toyota – may not simply be the
result of the inability to adapt to environmental changes, but are unintended conse-
quences of deliberate changes in the internal configuration of organizational choices, that
– at least - co-determine external misfit.
Once the causes of organizational misfit are recognized and understood by managers,
however, it is possible to amend complementatiries. Akio Toyoda publicly admitted in
2010 that the key reason for Toyota Motor Corp.’s quality problems was an excessive
focus on market share and profits that warped the “order of Toyota’s traditional prior-
ities” (Shirouzu 2010). The company responded to the crisis by returning to its basic
principle of genchi genbutsu which suggests that one needs to go to the genba or, the
‘real place’ where work is being done in order to truly understand a situation. In 2011
Akio Toyoda announced a new Global Vision that defines what kind of company To-
yota aspires to be, highlighting sustainable business with fuel-efficient, environmentally
friendly vehicles and stable relations with customers, suppliers, and communities. Signs
of financial recovery are already visible and indicate that Toyota is on its way to define
a new organizational configuration that promises a better fit with a globalized business
environment.Appendix
About the research
As lean production has been theorized over the last three decades by international re-
searchers studying Toyota’s activities, we drew on the rich secondary material on Toyota
and its internationalization history. In particular, we systematically analyzed press material
on Toyota published from 2000–2010 in major business and industry journals. In
addition, we intensively studied Toyota’s annual reports of that period as well as major
academic publications on the Toyota Way (e.g. Cusumano 1985; Cole 2011; Liker 2004;
Monden 2012; Fujimoto 1999). In addition, we monitored the media, both online and
print, on the Toyota recall crisis, and screened academic articles that provided an analysis
of the crisis (e.g. Cole 2011; Andrews et al. 2011; Kumar and Schmitz 2011). Both authors
also possess extensive experience of researching Toyota and its lean production system,
involving field visits to the headquarters in Toyota-City, the Toyota Global Production
Center in Motomachi and selected plants in Japan, North America, and Europe, which
also contributed to the necessary background knowledge of this case study.Source Number Time frame
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Union of Japanese Scientists and Engineers
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